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Abstract 
Reluctance is an extremely widespread phenomenon in international politics. For example, several 
rising powers have displayed an inconsistent, flip-flopping approach towards their regions and have 
not conformed to the expectations and wishes of their potential regional followers. While the notion of 
reluctance is frequently employed to describe this type of incoherent and unresponsive foreign policy, 
the concept of reluctance has not been systematically defined and discussed in the fields of 
International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis. This paper develops a conceptualization of 
reluctance by identifying the concept’s semantic field and discussing how reluctance relates to similar 
but distinct notions in the field of IR (concept reconstruction) and, on that basis, by outlining the 
constitutive dimensions of reluctance and their operationalization (concept building). To illustrate how 
this conceptualization of reluctance can provide new insights in empirical analyses, the concept is 
applied to the case of Germany’s approach to crisis management in Europe and the European 
neighborhood. 
Keywords 
Reluctance, rising powers, foreign policy, Germany, Eurozone crisis, Ukraine. 
 1 
Introduction1 
Events like the Ukraine crisis or the fast spread of ISIL in the Middle East have generated a perception 
that we are living in an increasingly crisis-ridden world, in an “age of entropy,” in which the 
international system has become “disordered, messed up, chaotic, and unpredictable” (Schweller 2014, 
10). This perception and arguably the chaos itself have been amplified by an apparent lack of countries 
able or willing to provide some kind of order or governance, either at the global level or in various 
world regions. While the United States has become increasingly preoccupied with domestic problems, 
rising powers like India, Brazil, China and South Africa have not displayed a readiness to step into the 
fray and contribute to the provision of order – thereby behaving, according to some authors, as free 
riders or “free risers” (Bunde and Oroz 2015, 22). Most importantly, these rising powers have not only 
failed to display a clear readiness to become substantively engaged in the management of global 
affairs beyond their regions, where their capabilities are still limited; they have also displayed rather 
ambivalent and indecisive foreign policies in their own regions, where their predominance, by 
contrast, is unequivocal. Brazil, for example, has at times been proactive in dealing with South 
American countries, for example by promoting MERCOSUR, but has also shown a high degree of 
ambivalence towards its region, not pushing regional integration beyond a certain point (Spektor 2010) 
and “not ceding the necessary authority for effective transnational institutionalization” (Burges 2014, 
8). South Africa’s approach to Africa has similarly been characterized as full of “ambiguities and 
contradictions” (Alden and Le Pere 2009, 145). India has also pursued an ambivalent policy in South 
Asia, combining hegemonic attitudes with cooperative rhetoric while refraining from the formulation 
of a leadership project for its conflict-ridden region (Destradi 2012). In many cases, despite its clear 
preponderance of power in South Asia, India has merely responded to initiatives developed by others 
and has been extremely reactive (Ganguly 2003). In Europe, despite the emergence of Germany as the 
regional power in the context of the Eurozone crisis (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013), several observers 
have noted that “[l]eadership from Berlin has been hesitant” and plagued by a “capacity-expectations 
gap” (Bulmer 2014, 1245). China has been rather assertive in its own region, but has also been 
described as pursuing an “incoherent grand strategy” beyond it (Pu 2012). According to some 
observers, China “deliberately speaks with different voices, depending on the target audience” 
(Schweller 2014, 69), thereby confusing its international partners.  
What we are therefore observing in our current crisis-ridden world is, especially among rising 
powers, a frequently incoherent flip-flopping contradictory way of doing foreign policy. Among its 
features is a diffuse unwillingness or inability to deal with different kinds of crisis and to contribute to 
the provision of governance and order in regional and international affairs, despite requests from other 
actors. This paper tries to make sense of this diffuse attitude by resorting to the notion of “reluctance” 
and developing a conceptualization of reluctance in international politics. The notion of reluctance is 
frequently used to describe this peculiarly indecisive way of doing foreign policy, for example with 
reference to India or to Germany, which have both been dubbed “reluctant hegemons” (Mitra 2003; 
Paterson 2011), or to South Africa, which has been termed a “reluctant leader” in Africa (Esterhuyse 
2010). Similarly, the Munich Security Report 2015 (Bunde and Oroz 2015), a brief publication 
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associated with the Munich Security Conference, was entitled Collapsing Orders, Reluctant 
Guardians, reflecting anxiety about the lack of actors able or willing to deal with international and 
regional crises decisively. The report even argues that the collapse of international order has itself 
been “both a driver and an effect of the increasing reluctance of its traditional guardians” (ibid., 22), 
like the United States, as well as of potential new guardians, the rising powers.  
Despite being frequently used in the literature, however, the notion of reluctance has not been 
explicitly defined or discussed so far. Most authors employ it in a rather casual unspecific way. While 
in its current under-specified and under-theorized application the term is not of much use beyond 
description, I argue that it can yield analytical benefits if it is appropriately conceptualized. In fact, the 
existing analytical toolbox in the fields of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis does 
not offer suitable concepts to make sense of the widespread phenomenon of powerful or rising states 
that pursue inconsistent confusing courses of action and do not bring to bear their power resources to 
coherently manage international crises that potentially affect them. 
Against this backdrop, this contribution aims to conceptualize reluctance in order to clarify the 
meaning of the concept and to make it applicable to empirical analyses of international politics. To do 
this, the paper builds upon and combines different approaches to concept reconstruction and concept 
building, which are briefly discussed in the next section. The actual conceptualization exercise 
proceeds as follows. First, based on a qualitative content analysis of selected IR literature that 
explicitly uses the notion of reluctance, I inductively identify the key issues usually associated with 
this term. This helps as a first approach to delineating the broader semantic field of reluctance, and 
thereby contributes to concept reconstruction as suggested by Giovanni Sartori (1984, 41-50). Based 
on this broader semantic field, in a second step I move on to identifying the theoretical approaches in 
the field of IR that address types of state behavior related to reluctance, but not necessarily identical to 
it. These are the notions of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression and under-balancing. I thus 
move beyond the mere semantics of reluctance and I find that the concept of reluctance shares some 
characteristics with each of the four notions, but is distinct from each of them. Based on the insights 
gained from situating the concept of reluctance in the broader IR literature, I proceed with the actual 
concept-building exercise, which follows the guidelines outlined by Gary Goertz (2006) in his work 
on social science concepts. I therefore discuss the negative poles of reluctance – i.e. what reluctance is 
not; I develop two core “secondary,” constitutive dimensions of reluctance; and I operationalize these 
two dimensions, developing indicators for empirical analysis. In a nutshell, I conceive of reluctance as 
a specific way or style of doing foreign policy that involves a hesitant, ambivalent, indecisive attitude 
and a certain recalcitrance about conforming to the expectations articulated by others. In the following 
section, I apply the concept of reluctance to an assessment of Germany’s policies in crisis management 
in Europe and in the European neighborhood. My aim is to illustrate how the application of this 
concept as an analytical tool helps shed new light on the controversial question of how to interpret 
German policies. Finally, I discuss how this more precise conceptualization of reluctance as a specific 
way of doing foreign policy can help us make sense of the policies of rising powers, and I develop 
some thoughts on the potential implications of reluctance for regional and global governance. 
Mapping the Field: Reconnecting Concept Reconstruction and Concept Building 
While the importance of concepts in the social sciences cannot be underestimated, extensive reflection 
on the process of defining and clarifying concepts remains rare, with notable exceptions (Sartori 1970, 
1975, 1984; Goertz 2006, 2008; Goertz and Mazur 2008; Collier et al. 2012). Among the few studies 
that explicitly deal with the issue of concept formation in the social sciences, there is disagreement on 
the first step to take. Giovanni Sartori suggests that this first step should always be “concept 
reconstruction,” which amounts to tracing the use of the concept in previous works in order to assess 
how others have defined it and to extract and systematize underlying characteristics (Sartori 1984, 41-
50). As a subsequent step, Sartori recommends “allocation of the term,” that is, the choice of a specific 
word to be associated with the concept one intends to study. To do this, one needs to relate the term 
Reluctant Powers: A Concept-Building Approach and an Application to the Case of Germany 
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that designates the concept to its semantic field to make sure that reconceptualization does not lead to 
a loss of meaning of other terms, or to an increase in ambiguity instead of greater clarity (ibid., 51-
53).
2
 Only after concept reconstruction and allocation of the term can we proceed to the main step of 
reconceptualization or concept building, according to Sartori. In a similar fashion, Adcock and Collier 
(2001, 531) argue that conceptualization – that is, the formulation of a systematized concept – must be 
based on an assessment of what they call the “background concept:” the existing “broad constellation 
of meanings and understandings associated with a given concept.”  
Much more than Sartori, Goertz (2006, 4) highlights that thinking about concepts involves going 
well beyond semantics – it implies carrying out a “theoretical and empirical analysis of the object or 
the phenomenon” that is being conceptualized. Correspondingly, Goertz (ibid., 5) thinks of concepts in 
ontological terms, since conceptualizations imply focusing on what constitutes a phenomenon; in 
causal terms, since the central dimensions of concepts have causal powers, which in turn shape 
theories that employ these concepts; and in realist terms, since concepts always relate to empirical 
phenomena. To adequately address these aspects, it is important to address the structure of concepts 
and the relationships between the different dimensions and levels within concepts in the concept-
building exercise. According to Goertz (ibid., 27), developing a concept amounts to “deciding what is 
important about an entity [emphasis added].” However, he does not tell us much on how to make this 
essential decision in the first stage of concept building. In other words, how do we know what is 
important about an entity? In order to avoid at least some of the arbitrariness that might be associated 
with starting the concept-building exercise without appropriate groundwork, it is useful to start with 
concept reconstruction, as suggested by Sartori (or to assess the background concept, in Adcock and 
Collier’s terms). The need to build upon previous uses of a concept seems particularly compelling for 
notions like reluctance, which are already frequently employed in the literature but in a confused and 
unspecific manner – that is, when concept building is used to clarify the meaning of an existing term.  
Concept Reconstruction: The Broader Semantic Field 
As a first step, it is therefore useful to map the field, that is, to analyze existing literature that uses the 
concept of reluctance in order to find out how the concept is defined and what notions and types of 
behavior are usually associated with it. While the notion of reluctance is not specific to International 
Relations or to Political Science and is indeed frequently used in a range of fields, from Medicine to 
Sociology and Psychology to analyze specific forms of behavior, a striking commonality across 
disciplines is an absence of definitions or sophisticated operationalizations of reluctance. For example, 
clinical studies that deal with patients’ reluctance to take preventive medication, to undergo preventive 
tests, or to seek treatment, either simply equate reluctance with a choice not to do something (Quaid 
and Morris 1993) or, in a slightly more sophisticated manner, associate reluctance with a general 
resistance to taking medication (Port et al. 2001) or with the notion of not seeing a doctor despite 
knowing one should do so or despite family and friends thinking one should do so (Meltzer et al. 
2000). A sociological study of people’s reluctance to relocate for a better job does not discuss the 
concept of reluctance itself, but simply operationalizes it by looking at different degrees of stated 
(un)willingness (Bielby and Bielby 1992). Or, to mention another example, in a study on reluctance to 
communicate undesirable information, reluctance is operationalized as a time lag in the transmission 
of information or as the transmission of incomplete information (Rosen and Tesser 1970).  
In studies that focus on the reluctance of states in foreign policy, that is, in the fields of 
International Relations and History, we observe a similar lack of definitions. In fact, most studies that 
prominently mention reluctance in their titles do not explicitly define or discuss the concept, and, in 
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the case of books, do not even include the term in the index (e.g. Fehl 2012; Haass 1997; Lowe 1967; 
Dueck 2006). Nevertheless, these studies address a specific type of state behavior or a specific way of 
doing foreign policy that has distinct and identifiable characteristics. In order to gather more 
systematic information on how reluctance is understood in the field of IR, I have carried out a 
qualitative content analysis of selected studies that prominently use this term, proceeding inductively, 
that is, approaching the text corpus without a pre-defined set of categories. The results of the analysis 
are displayed in Figure 1.
3
  
Figure 1 Notions associated with reluctance in international politics 
 
Reluctance is usually associated, among other things, with a highly ambivalent attitude, hesitant 
behavior and a selective commitment. For example, as Fehl (2012, 10) highlights, a reluctant United 
States was the main proponent of an International Trade Organization after World War II, but later 
stopped supporting the idea; it signed most human rights conventions, but then did not ratify them 
during the Cold War.
4
 In the post-Cold War world, according to Haass (1997), the United States has 
become a “reluctant sheriff,” struggling with the costs of providing order and with decreasing 
domestic interest in and consensus on foreign policy issues. This reluctance is associated with ad-hoc 
short-term approaches and with a lack of “clarity and soundness of purpose” (ibid., 3).5 Schweller 
                                                     
3
 The analysis proceeded in a “data-driven way,” that is, by “letting [the] categories emerge from the data” (Schreier 2012, 
25). In other words, the text corpus was analyzed by looking specifically for expressions associated with the notion of 
reluctance or used to describe behavior defined as “reluctant.” This approach is suitable given the descriptive aim of the 
exercise (ibid., 43): the identification of the broader semantic field of concepts that are associated with reluctance in the 
literature. The different aspects emerging inductively from the text were summarized in categories, which are highlighted 
in italics in this paper: ambivalent attitude, hesitant behavior, selective commitment, incoherence, obstructionism towards 
others’ initiatives, and slowness. Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between more specific aspects such as “decline 
financial contributions” or “no alternative vision” and the inductively elaborated categories, which are visualized in 
bigger characters as emerging out of the concept cloud. 
4
 For a prescriptive approach proposing the notion of “selective engagement,” see Art 2003, ch. 4. 
5
 On a rather different note, Ikenberry (1998/99, 63) argues that the United States acted as a “reluctant superpower” in the 
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(2014, 6) similarly sees a danger in the current attitude of the United States, which risks becoming an 
“elephant on the sidelines, a potential but reluctant hegemon unwilling to lead.” An analysis of 
Norway’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s approaches to European integration identifies reluctance with 
skepticism towards integration. A preference for more limited forms of integration and the adoption of 
hesitant policies are seen as distinctive of this reluctant attitude (Gstöhl 2002, 3-4). Related to 
ambivalence, hesitation, and selectivity of commitment is a high degree of incoherence in a reluctant 
country’s policies – as Patrick puts it, Washington “has often seemed skittish about committing itself 
to proposed international legal regimes,” for example on the ICC or on human rights conventions 
(Patrick 2002, 5). Similarly, Britain in the second half of the 19
th
 century has been termed a “reluctant 
imperialist,” with reluctance amounting to caution and aloofness from European affairs (Lowe 1967, 
9) and, interestingly, to a certain “amateurishness” in foreign policy-making (ibid., 13). Other 
elements associated with reluctance are an obstructionism towards others’ initiatives and a certain 
slowness in implementing policies, with delays and sometimes even the adoption of “time-buying” 
tactics. For example, the US Senate during the 1990s “stalled, diluted, or defeated” a range of 
multilateral initiatives in the field of control of weapons of mass destruction, with the most evident 
case being the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Patrick 2002, 3).  
In sum, an assessment of the broader semantic field of reluctance reveals that this notion is related 
to policies that are ambivalent and at times even obstructionist towards the initiatives of others, that 
involve shirking responsibility, a hesitant attitude, delays in implementation, selectivity of 
commitments, and incoherence.  
Concept Reconstruction: Related Theoretical Approaches 
Based on the above assessment of the broader semantic field of reluctance, a further useful step in 
concept reconstruction consists in relating the concept to existing theoretical approaches in the field, in 
this case in the subject area of International Relations. In particular, there are four notions that are 
explicitly or implicitly related to the concept of reluctance as it has developed from the analysis of the 
broader semantic field, and that describe different types of foreign policy that powerful or rising states 
can adopt. They are exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression, and under-balancing. Figure 2 
provides an overview of these concepts and an illustration of how reluctance relates to them, with the 
dashed lines indicating that the concepts are not just closely interrelated but sometimes even 
overlapping. The four concepts, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections, can 
be ordered according to the cooperative vs. conflictive nature of the environment; and to the general 
attitude of the actor, which can be more or less outward- vs. inward-looking.  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
reluctance had positive implications since it reassured other states “that the United States would operate within limits and 
not use its overwhelming power position simply to dominate”(ibid.).  
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Figure 2 Concepts related to reluctance 
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The concept of exceptionalism refers to a body of literature that studies the foreign policy of states that 
have a particular sense of entitlement or a perception of being exceptional and therefore not subject to 
the rules and constraints binding other states. This leads, on the one hand, to policies aimed at 
“liberating” others in the name of some messianic belief or some special responsibility (Holsti 2010) – 
a feature that is barely related to reluctance. With reference to the United States, underlying this 
neoconservative approach to exceptionalism is the notion that an exceptional country “should be 
exempted from the international rules that bind other nations” (Halperin and Boyer 2007, 2). On the 
other hand, therefore, exceptionalism entails efforts to achieve freedom of action by shedding the 
burden of cooperation in multilateral institutions and regimes (Holsti 2010; Halperin and Boyer 2010). 
In studies on the United States, the main arguments used to explain this attitude are superpower status, 
which makes multilateralism unattractive since it constrains the dominant power; and a range of 
domestic-level arguments concerning the balance of power between the US President and Congress, 
poor coordination among different agencies, partisan wrangling, bureaucratic competition etc. (Patrick 
2002). Studies on rising powers take a similar view, arguing that these countries often shirk 
responsibilities in international settings, that is, they “want the privileges of power but are unwilling to 
pay for them by contributing to global governance” (Schweller and Pu 2011, 42). Overall, therefore, 
some parts of the literature on exceptionalism address the problem of powerful or rising countries that 
are not willing to lead or to provide public goods in international organizations, are not ready to make 
concessions in global governance regimes, or do not want to bear some of the costs of public good 
provision. Therefore, with reference to multilateral settings, the focus is on ambivalence, hesitation 
and a general unwillingness to commit, which are important elements generally associated with the 
notion of reluctance. Exceptionalism is placed on the side of “outward-looking” attitudes in Figure 2 
as it does not only refer to a passive and self-referential unwillingness to get entangled (isolationism), 
but to a more general recalcitrance about actively promoting multilateral cooperation or collective 
action. The potential decisiveness of exceptionalist powers in bilateral settings, in turn, distinguishes 
exceptionalism from reluctance, which is usually associated with hesitant, indecisive action.  
The literature on isolationism focuses on powerful countries that decide to pursue a “minimalist” 
foreign policy characterized by limited goals, a high degree of restraint,
6
 and a limited amount of 
resources devoted to foreign policy (Haass 1997, 55). Isolationism does not only involve an 
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unwillingness to use military force: isolationist countries prefer not to get engaged abroad at all, they 
are clearly inward-looking and therefore limit the resources devoted to different instruments of foreign 
policy, including diplomacy and foreign aid (ibid, 57). Correspondingly, isolationism is mostly 
equated with a policy of non-entanglement and with abstention from commitments. Authors like Legro 
(2005, 51) prefer to talk about “separatism,” understood not as strict isolation but as “nonengagement, 
aloofness, and detached unilateralism.” This type of foreign policy is considered to be the opposite of 
internationalism (Legro 2005, 50). Among the typical examples of isolationist countries are Japan 
between the 18
th
 century and the Meiji Restoration – a case of strict isolationism (Legro 2005, 128-31) 
– and the United States between the world wars, which was certainly not fully isolated, but refused to 
get engaged abroad and was characterized by strong isolationist ideas, which were only slowly 
replaced by an internationalist approach (ibid., ch. 3).
7
 The notion of isolationism does not exclusively 
or necessarily apply to the field of military intervention, that is, to conflictive settings. It can also mean 
that states do not make use of cooperative opportunities. Authors like Dueck (2006, 27) somewhat 
explicitly equate a “preference for nonentanglement” with reluctance, thereby reflecting the close 
relationship between the concepts of reluctance and isolationism. At the same time, there are 
differences. For example, the element of hesitation, which is mostly associated with reluctance, does 
not necessarily form part of an isolationist policy: consistent and resolute isolationism (Nordlinger 
1995, 9) has little in common with the indecisiveness that is typical of reluctance.  
The literature on under-aggression or under-expansion focuses specifically on rising powers and 
tries to explain why an increase in power capabilities does not necessarily translate into an aggressive 
and expansionist foreign policy as expected by offensive realism. Among the typical cases analyzed is 
the “imperial understretch” of the United States after the Civil War, which Zakaria (1998), for 
example, explains with the weakness of US state structure. Dueck (2006, 2) relates the notion of 
under-expansionism to the concept of reluctance by asking why Americans have been “reluctant 
crusaders:” “crusaders in the promotion of a more liberal international order” but “reluctant to admit 
the full costs of promoting this liberal international vision.” Like Zakaria, Dueck combines systemic 
with domestic-level variables, but with a focus on strategic culture as an explanation for under-
aggression. Recently, Meiser (2015) has added to the literature on US under-expansionism (or, in his 
words, restraint) by focusing, again, on why the rising United States did not expand territorially 
between 1898 and 1941, with his explanation mostly focusing on domestic institutions and the path-
dependency effects of restraint. Among the authors who look beyond the case of the US is Schweller, 
who investigates what he calls “the suboptimal reluctance to use force or to build up military power”
 
(Schweller 2009, 227) on the part of most great powers in the 20
th
 century. His contentious conclusion 
is that only fascist regimes could manage to develop the “‘ideologized’ power politics for mass 
consumption” (ibid., 230) that are required for expansionism in the modern world and involve a 
substantial mobilization of the population. The notions of under-aggression and under-expansion 
therefore refer to policies of countries that are not necessarily inward-looking, but for different reasons 
do not realize their outward-looking potential in military terms. These notions relate to reluctance, but 
with a specific reference to conflictive policies, thereby excluding the more subtle nuances mostly 
associated with the concept of reluctance, which involves a whole array of indecisive hesitant flip-
flopping policies. While most approaches explain under-aggression as an “unwillingness” to expand, 
some also take into account the “inability” or, more generally, the constraints faced by powerful 
countries. Among the main limitations of approaches that focus on under-aggression or restraint is that 
they necessarily have to work with counterfactuals to explain why something that would have been 
expected has not taken place (see, for example, Meiser 2015). By contrast, the notion of reluctance, if 
appropriately conceptualized and operationalized, refers to observable actual foreign-policy behavior. 
Finally, a related notion is that of under-balancing, which describes the attitude of countries that do 
not respond to threats in conflictive settings by mobilizing military power or by forging alliances 
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(Schweller 2004; 2006). Unlike under-aggression, therefore, it does not focus on a lack of initiative or 
on why states are “timid” (Schweller 2006, 20). Instead, it focuses on why states do not react to 
dangerous aggressors or to dangerous changes in relative power as expected by balance-of-power 
theory (ibid., 10). It refers, therefore, to inward-looking policies as outlined in Figure 2. Among the 
four concepts, under-balancing is probably most closely associated with reluctance, as Schweller 
(ibid., 63) explicitly acknowledges that it can take the form of “half measures, muddling through, and 
incoherent grand strategies” and thus reflects the incoherence and ambivalence that is frequently 
associated with reluctance. However, under-balancing addresses only a very specific context for 
reluctant behavior, namely the situation of being threatened by another country – a situation in which 
reluctant behavior is a “mistake” (Schweller 2004, 168) that potentially affects a state’s survival. 
Therefore, it does not refer to a broader spectrum of foreign-policy contexts and situations that go 
beyond the particular setting of being threatened by another state. Moreover, by focusing on under-
balancing as a “mistake,” it ignores cases in which buying time, preferring not to commit too heavily, 
or shirking responsibility might be rational approaches to follow or, at least, suitable ways of dealing 
with different types of pressure and expectations. 
The concept of reluctance therefore touches upon each of the four concepts discussed above yet 
differs from each of them in important respects. As each of them is “a generalizable behavior, as 
opposed to a unique or individual occurrence, that shares certain distinguishing features, such that it 
forms a class of historical cases” (Schweller 2006, 16), the same holds for reluctance. What the four 
concepts of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression and under-balancing share is the diffuse 
notion of not doing something that might be appropriate, of being forms of behavior that do not 
conform with certain expectations, be they of disgruntled followers who would like to see greater 
engagement on the part of powerful countries, be they of theoretical approaches. This notion of not 
fulfilling the expectations of others is another important element associated with reluctance. At the 
same time, the concept of reluctance stands between exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression 
and under-balancing since it can refer to both inward- and outward-looking actors in both cooperative 
and conflictive settings. This implies that reluctance is not limited to one specific policy field. The 
question “reluctance to do what?” can therefore be answered in very different ways. Reluctance itself 
does not necessarily just refer to an unwillingness to lead or to not pursuing hegemonic policies, as 
suggested by studies that resort to notions like “reluctant hegemony.” Just as isolationism can be 
interpreted as a reluctance to get entangled, exceptionalism as a reluctance to engage in multilateral 
settings, under-aggression as a reluctance to attack or to expand, and under-balancing as a reluctance 
to react to threats, reluctance itself encompasses all of these elements. It is therefore not a behavior 
that only applies to a specific field. It rather constitutes a peculiar type or style of foreign policy that 
can be found across issue areas and settings, a kind of meta-behavior that shapes actual policies and 
becomes visible in them.
8
  
Reluctance: Concept Building  
The above identification of the broader semantic field of reluctance in International Relations and our 
discussion of related theoretical approaches has allowed us to obtain some insights into the 
“background concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 531) of reluctance. This is a useful starting point: 
“concept reconstruction is a means whose ultimate purpose is to provide a cleaned-up basis for 
construction – that is, for the formation of concepts” (Sartori 1984, 50). In other words, concept 
reconstruction helps us to grasp “what is important about an entity” (Goertz 2006, 27). On this basis, 
we can now proceed with concept building, and to that end we will follow the guidelines proposed by 
Goertz (2006) as this work provides important ideas on how to think about the structure of concepts.  
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The Negative Poles 
The first step in concept building consists in identifying the “basic level” of a concept, that is, the 
concept “as used in theoretical propositions” (Goertz 2006, 6). In our case, the basic-level concept is 
reluctance. A useful way to sharpen our understanding of a basic-level concept entails thinking 
explicitly about the negative pole of that concept, that is, about what the concept is not. For the case of 
reluctance, there is not a single obvious negative pole. Within the broader idea of “non-reluctance,” 
however, we can think of two dimensions that constitute the opposite of reluctance on two different 
continuums: 1) determination, and 2) being responsive to demands made by others. Determination 
amounts to a resolute, decisive and consistent attitude, which involves the ability to make decisions 
without displaying much hesitation. The concept of determination therefore encompasses the opposite 
of the ambivalence, incoherence, hesitancy, and slowness that characterize reluctance. By 
responsiveness to others’ demands I understand reacting readily and sympathetically to appeals and 
requests by other actors, particularly by less powerful actors in a hierarchical setting like that existing 
between rising regional powers and smaller neighboring states. Potential followers can ask the 
regional power to participate in common initiatives, to deliver public goods, to support a certain cause, 
to act in a less intrusive manner – and many other things. A country that is responsive to such demands 
will not shirk responsibility, will not be unwilling to commit fully, and will not display an 
obstructionist attitude towards the demands made by others – in other words, a responsive country will 
not be reluctant.  
Determination and responsiveness therefore constitute different dimensions of the negative pole of 
reluctance. They can help us to clarify the actual “constitutive” or “secondary-level” dimensions of the 
concept of reluctance.
9
  
Constitutive Dimensions and Concept Structure 
As illustrated in Figure 3, reluctance has two constitutive dimensions: hesitation and recalcitrance. 
These dimensions are “constitutive” in the sense that they tell us what the basic-level concept of 
reluctance consists of: “Concepts are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental 
constitutive elements of a phenomenon” (Goertz 2006, 5). As such, concepts are not just important as 
constructs that help us to grasp empirical reality, but they also have an impact on theorizing and 
hypothesis testing. As a consequence, concepts and the ways they are constructed have huge 
implications for all the successive phases of a research project (think of the implications of 
conceptualization for case selection); elements of causality are often inherent in concepts, and need to 
be appropriately acknowledged.  
Hesitation is, along a continuum entailing different degrees of resolve in an actor’s behavior, the 
polar opposite of determination. It involves an ambivalent incoherent attitude. Reluctance is therefore 
much more than just under-aggression or under-expansionism. Nor does reluctance necessarily amount 
to the adoption of a “hands-off” policy, that is, to inactivity. A consistent refusal to get involved in a 
military dispute, for example, is not reluctant behavior understood as hesitation, since it actually 
amounts to a clear and coherent policy course. For example, the fact that Japan and Germany were for 
several decades “reluctant to resort to the use of military force” (Berger 1996, 318) does not amount to 
reluctance as hesitation as understood in this study, since their attitude was coherent. If, however, we 
observe contrasting and incoherent statements on the need to become active, or possibly even some 
engagement followed by backtracking, this will amount to reluctance. 
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Recalcitrance is the second core dimension of reluctance, and it is the opposite of being 
responsive to others’ demands – along a continuum referring to the degree of openness 
towards the wishes of others, especially of potential followers. It involves opposing the 
wishes articulated by others. For example, Fehl (2012, 4) highlights that the United States 
displayed a “scepticism or outright opposition to multilateral treaty initiatives strongly 
favoured by European states.” The latter demanded a stronger commitment on the part of 
Washington, which, however, was recalcitrant – that is, unresponsive to the demands 
articulated by its European partners.  
Figure 3 Negative Poles and Secondary/Constitutive Dimensions of Reluctance 
 
An essential step in building concepts is the clarification and discussion of their structure, which has 
huge consequences for their extension and intension (Sartori 1970). In fact, depending on whether one 
adopts a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions structure or a “family resemblance” structure that does 
not entail any necessary conditions (Goertz 2006, 35-46), the number of secondary dimensions will 
have an impact on the categories of phenomena that are covered by the concept. The concept of 
reluctance as developed in this paper follows a traditional necessary-and-sufficient conditions 
structure: the two secondary dimensions, hesitation and recalcitrance, are necessary and jointly 
sufficient to define reluctance – and are therefore connected by the logical operator AND. In fact, 
recalcitrance – a lack of responsiveness to the demands made by others – would alone be insufficient 
to characterize foreign-policy behavior as reluctant. States are continually confronted with 
expectations articulated by very different actors, be they other countries, international organizations, 
transnational NGOs, their own public or other domestic actors. As these expectations and pressures 
will in most cases be contradictory, given the very different structural positions and interests of the 
actors articulating them, any foreign-policy decision will invariably ignore or reject the demands made 
by some of these actors. If recalcitrance were a sufficient condition to conceptualize reluctance – or, in 
other words, if the concept had a family resemblance structure with a logical OR between the two 
dimensions – the concept’s extension would grow indefinitely, up to the inclusion of any kind of 
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foreign-policy activity. Recalcitrance alone cannot therefore count as a sufficient condition to define 
reluctance. At the same time, hesitation, if it entails incoherent and contradictory statements and 
policies, will inevitably disappoint at least some expectations articulated by other actors, as the 
reluctant power will oscillate between being responsive to these expectations and ignoring or rejecting 
them. In other words, hesitation and recalcitrance are sometimes closely intertwined and need to be 
considered jointly. By conceptualizing foreign-policy reluctance as constituted by the necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions of hesitation and recalcitrance, we avoid the ambiguities inherent in much 
of the literature, which amplify the concept’s extension by treating reluctance in a loose and 
unspecified manner. 
These thoughts on the concept structure of reluctance have theoretical implications. For example, 
the inclusion of recalcitrance in the concept will have an impact on the development of a theory of 
reluctance in international politics. The simple observation of an indecisive flip-flopping foreign 
policy on the part of a government could in principle be easily termed reluctance, but the inclusion of 
the element of recalcitrance with its refusal to conform to the expectations of other actors has 
important consequences. If we focus on the reluctance displayed by rising regional powers in their 
own regions and if we take the foreign policy of these countries as an independent variable to explain, 
for example, variations in regional cooperation, then recalcitrance matters. In fact, a recalcitrant 
attitude vis-à-vis the wishes articulated by smaller regional countries will most likely lead to 
disillusionment and disaffection among them, and thus contribute to hampering regional cooperation. 
For example, India has long been recalcitrant in its approach to its smaller neighbors in South Asia, 
refusing to make concessions on matters like trade. This has fueled the suspicions of small countries of 
New Delhi and has induced them to see China as an attractive alternative partner. The consequences 
for regional cooperation in South Asia have been disastrous (Destradi 2012). On a different note, if we 
take reluctance as a dependent variable, we might hypothesize that it can emerge as a consequence of 
competing expectations articulated by different actors. Recalcitrance, understood as an unwillingness 
or impossibility to respond to all of these expectations, would then reflect the dilemma of countries 
that have difficulties in accommodating and mediating between different expectations. 
Operationalization 
The third level of concepts is constituted by indicators to be applied in the analysis of empirical 
phenomena. An operationalization of reluctance in terms of hesitation and recalcitrance has the 
advantage of allowing us to avoid counterfactual arguments and to focus exclusively on observable 
behavior. As mentioned above, the use of counterfactuals is an important part, but also one of the 
weaknesses, of the literature on under-expansionism. Similarly, several publications focusing on 
“reluctant” powers work with counterfactuals when lamenting untapped leadership potential (see, for 
example, publications on Germany as a reluctant hegemon or, more generally, on Germany’s role in 
the Eurozone crisis, e.g. The Economist 2013; see also Jones 2010, 26). The indicators of hesitation 
and recalcitrance developed in this paper, by contrast, allow us to identify reluctance in foreign policy 
on the basis of observable foreign-policy behavior.
10
 
Hesitation can be identified by the following indicators:  
- Lack of initiative: with a particular focus on powerful countries such as rising regional powers, 
this indicator implies that smaller states develop and implement suggestions and solutions on a 
specific issue or crisis that is relevant not just to them but also to the rising regional power. The 
powerful actor, therefore, free-rides on that initiative by not contributing resources proportionate 
to its weight and does not come up with own policies and solutions. This indicator of hesitation 
refers to a passive policy as a powerful country stands on the sidelines and lets other actors take 
the lead. 
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- Delaying: hesitation can take a more explicit form if the dominant country buys time and does not 
stick to a previously agreed time frame, thereby postponing important decisions in dealing with a 
specific issue or crisis.
11
  
- Flip-flopping in statements and/or policies: this is the most evident form of hesitation. It can be 
observed if the statements on a specific issue made by members of the executive or other official 
government representatives are not consistent over time but change frequently or suddenly, or if 
policies on that issue are not coherent, but keep changing rapidly.
12
 Flip-flopping is also associated 
with contradictions in statements or policies among different representatives of the same 
government on a specific issue.  
Recalcitrance, which is a lack of responsiveness towards the demands made by others, can be assessed 
through the following indicators: 
- Ignoring requests made by others: the government of the dominant country does not react to calls 
made by other actors and its policies do not reflect the preferences articulated by them. 
- Rejecting requests: the government of the dominant country explicitly refuses to comply with the 
wishes articulated by other actors. 
- Obstructing others’ initiatives: the government of the dominant country hampers others’ activities. 
This does not necessarily happen through an explicit veto or other formal procedures, but can take 
place informally, for example in the context of multilateral decision-making processes in which 
smaller countries will tend to conform to the preferences of a powerful actor. 
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Figure 4 The Concept Structure of Reluctance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the indicators of both hesitation and recalcitrance, there is a logical OR, which implies that for 
each dimension it is sufficient to observe at least one of the three indicators in order to classify foreign 
policy as hesitant or recalcitrant, but that more than one indicator can be observed at the same time. 
For example, a hesitant country can display both a lack of initiative in the management of serious 
crises and at the same time it can delay initiatives proposed by others. Similarly, to mention another 
example, a recalcitrant country can both ignore requests made by others and at the same time hamper 
their initiatives.  
Importantly, both hesitation and recalcitrance can occur to different degrees. The indicators of 
recalcitrance are arrayed along a continuum ranging from a mere ignoring of requests to the rejection 
of requests and active obstructionism of initiatives promoted by other actors. Depending on the 
combination of these indicators, on the frequency with which they appear, and on the salience of the 
issues on which a state is recalcitrant, we can classify recalcitrance as low, medium or high, with an 
appropriate weighting to be applied in specific empirical analyses. The same is true for hesitation, 
where a lack of initiative is a less explicit form of hesitation as compared to the delaying of decisions, 
while flip-flopping is the most evident type of hesitant behavior. These different intensities and the 
possible different combinations of lack of initiative, delaying and flip-flopping can therefore lead to 
varying degrees of hesitation. For example, a country whose foreign policy is strongly flip-flopping in 
crucial decision processes will obviously count as more reluctant than a country whose foreign policy 
displays little flip-flopping, strong initiatives, but some delays in the implementation of policies. As 
illustrated in Table 1, the combination of indicators of hesitation and recalcitrance leads to the 
identification of different degrees of reluctant behavior. This more fine-grained assessment of 
Basic-level 
concept 
Secondary/ 
constitutive  
dimensions 
Indicators 
Reluctance 
Hesitation 
Recalcitrance 
AND 
Lack of initiative 
Delaying 
Flip-flopping 
Obstructing others‘ initiatives 
Rejecting requests 
Ignoring requests 
OR 
OR 
OR 
OR 
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reluctance, which goes beyond a mere dichotomous understanding of the concept, can prove helpful in 
the assessment of variation in foreign-policy reluctance. Moreover, it will prove useful in tracing 
processes of policy change by highlighting shifts in the intensity of reluctant behavior.  
Table 1 Intensity of Reluctance 
 
No hesitation 
(determination) 
 
Hesitation 
Lack of initiative OR Delaying OR Flip-flopping 
  Low Medium High 
No recalcitrance 
(responsiveness) 
Determination 
+ 
responsiveness 
= no reluctance 
Hesitation, but 
responsiveness 
= no reluctance 
Hesitation, but 
responsiveness 
= no reluctance 
High hesitation, 
but 
responsiveness 
=> grey zone 
Recalcitrance 
Ignoring 
requests 
OR 
Rejecting 
requests 
OR 
Actively 
blocking 
initiatives 
Low 
Recalcitrance, 
but 
determination 
= no reluctance 
+ ++ +++ 
Medium 
Recalcitrance, 
but 
determination 
= no reluctance 
++ ++ +++ 
High 
 
Recalcitrance, 
but 
determination 
= no reluctance 
+++ +++ ++ 
Table 1 also highlights that hesitation and recalcitrance are both necessary conditions for reluctance. 
That is, a recalcitrant but determined attitude – for example a coherent refusal to comply with smaller 
regional countries’ wishes – would not amount to reluctance. Similarly, a hesitant but responsive 
attitude would not necessarily correspond to reluctance if hesitation takes a moderate form through 
lacking initiative on secondary issues or small delays. In fact, while it is hard for an actor to be fully 
responsive in the case of an entirely incoherent flip-flopping policy, a delayed reaction to the wishes 
of others or conforming to their wishes while not developing initiatives would not qualify as 
reluctance. The case of a highly hesitant policy combined with some degree of responsiveness makes 
for an interesting “gray zone,” which includes those cases at the fuzzy border between positive and 
negative cases (Goertz 2006, 20).
13
 Another particular set of cases are those in which an actor is both 
highly recalcitrant (that is, an actor is rather openly hampering the initiatives promoted by others) and, 
at the same time, highly hesitant. In this case, we can expect the two dimensions of hesitation and 
recalcitrance to partially offset each other, so that the outcome will be a comparatively more moderate 
form of reluctance (illustrated as ++ in Table 1). 
An Application: Germany as a Reluctant Power? 
Is the introduction of yet one more concept in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis 
really necessary? What is the conceptualization of reluctance carried out in this paper useful for? From 
a conceptual and theoretical perspective, discussion of the differences between reluctance and the 
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related concepts of exceptionalism, isolationism, under-aggression, and under-balancing has already 
shown that reluctance is useful to characterize a particular type of foreign-policy conduct that is not 
adequately captured by existing concepts in the field of IR. But what about the analytical usefulness of 
the concept of reluctance in empirical analyses? To illustrate how reluctance as a concept can help us 
to make sense of empirical phenomena, it will be applied to a brief assessment of Germany’s 
contemporary foreign and security policy in Europe and in the European neighborhood, with a 
particular focus on crisis management. The analysis will address Germany’s approach to the Eurozone 
crisis, to the intervention in Libya in 2011, and to the Ukraine crisis, thereby covering both the issue 
areas of economic/financial and security policy.
14
  
The case of Germany for an illustrative application of the concept of reluctance is suitable for 
several reasons. The main reason is that assessments of German foreign policy vary widely and are 
sometimes framed in terms of reluctance, but without a discussion or definition of the concept. When 
it comes to Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis, for example, several observers have highlighted 
that “[l]eadership from Berlin has been hesitant” (Bulmer 2014, 1245) and up until 2013 argued that 
“Germany’s current foot-dragging poses larger dangers” (The Economist 2013). By contrast, other 
observers maintain that Germany has not been reluctant at all during the Eurozone crisis. Some of 
them are apologetic of Berlin’s approach and argue that what looks like reluctance was instead the 
result of “longer pauses for reflection” (Münkler 2015, 162) and of a careful approach to policy-
making. Others highlight that throughout the crisis the German government consistently pursued its 
policy of austerity, imposing its will on the rest of Europe with only apparent hesitation (Beck 2012). 
This assessment reflects a more general criticism of German policies coming from southern Europe 
(Spiegel Online International 2015). Some conceptual clarity and an application of the above-
developed indicators might help to gain better insights into German policies and into what is 
frequently referred to as German reluctance. Moreover, an assessment of the policies of what has 
arguably become the most influential country in Europe (Münkler 2015) is suitable to illustrate the 
policy-relevance of proper conceptualization.  
Germany in the Eurozone Crisis: From Reluctance to Determination 
During the Eurozone crisis, which erupted in autumn 2009, Germany’s approach shifted over different 
phases. During the first months of the crisis, the German government was clearly reluctant, as its 
behavior involved both elements of hesitation and recalcitrance. An indicator of hesitation is the delay 
with which Germany developed responses to the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis, Chancellor 
Merkel argued that it was a Greek domestic problem. According to some authors (e.g. Schild 2013, 
28), Merkel explicitly “delayed common European action” ahead of a regional election that was to 
take place in the North-Rhine Westphalia Land on May 9, 2010. Moreover, Berlin’s approach to the 
crisis during its early phase was reactive, leading to several contradictions between German 
government statements and policies (flip-flopping). At the level of statements, government officials 
time and again tried to reassure the German public that Berlin would not commit itself too heavily, but 
in many cases the German government later had to backtrack on these commitments. To cite just one 
example, on March 21, 2010, Merkel stated “Help is not on the agenda” (Janssen 2012) – only to 
agree, in May 2010, to the first bailout package for Greece and to the establishment of the European 
Financial Stability Facility with a German guarantee of 27.13% (Paterson 2011, 69). In between, in 
April 2010, Merkel replied evasively to Greece’s request for a safety net, giving an impression of 
“indecisiveness” (Traynor 2010). This reactivity and incoherence was mainly related to an 
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increasingly hostile domestic attitude in Germany towards crisis management and European solidarity, 
which clashed with the expectations of other member states and the sheer need to do something to 
avoid disaster. Germany was caught by surprise by the unfolding of events and reacted to them in a 
piecemeal manner. As an interviewee at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy said, 
“There were no established instruments or mechanisms to deal with the crisis. It was uncharted 
territory […] We could not have acted faster.”15 Besides the above-mentioned contradictions between 
statements and actual policies, several incoherent and contradictory statements were also made by 
members of the government, most notably Finance Minister Schäuble and Chancellor Merkel, further 
contributing to flip-flopping. For example, in March 2010, Schäuble developed a proposal about a 
European monetary fund modeled along the lines of the IMF (Welt am Sonntag 2010; Schäuble 2010) 
– an idea the Chancellery reportedly learned about from the media, and which clearly contradicted 
Merkel’s rejection of financial transfers to debtor countries (Feldenkirchen et al. 2010, 22). Moreover, 
Schäuble had dismissed the idea of an IMF participation in European crisis management, but was 
brusquely contradicted by Chancellor Merkel during a speech in Parliament in March 2010 (ibid., 21). 
As a result, “one got the impression that in Berlin the right hand didn’t know what the left was doing” 
(ibid., 22). When it comes to the third indicator of hesitation, a lack of initiative, this was partially in 
place in the early phase of the Eurozone crisis, but disappeared when the German position on austerity 
and conditionalities consolidated and was articulated in a more consistent manner. Besides these 
elements of hesitation, a medium level of recalcitrance was also clearly in place: by initially labeling 
the crisis as a Greek problem and refusing to help, the German government rejected requests for crisis 
management. Berlin did not ignore (low recalcitrance) these requests, as from the beginning of the 
crisis German government representatives met with their counterparts from other EU member states 
and EU institutions to discuss the problem of Greece. Berlin rather straightforwardly rejected those 
demands that did not fit with its preferences. On the issue of Eurobonds, for example, Germany’s 
rejection was consistent over time, even though it was articulated in increasingly drastic terms, up to 
Merkel’s infamous June 2012 statement “no Eurobonds as long as I live” (Spiegel Online 2012). 
While Germany’s approach to the Eurozone crisis was initially highly reluctant, over time reluctance 
decreased. On the one hand, Germany’s recalcitrance remained constant as Berlin continued to reject 
requests for greater concessions. On the other hand, however, most elements of hesitation were left 
aside as the German position towards the crisis increasingly consolidated: delaying became a less 
explicitly used tactic compared to the 2009-10 period, Germany took the initiative more openly, and 
flip-flopping diminished. A first instance of increasing determination could be observed with the 
bilateral German-French informal summit meeting in Deauville in October 2010, the outcome of 
which was criticized as a “Franco-German diktat” (Schild 2013, 37). The meeting paved the way for a 
period of intense consultations between Merkel and Sarkozy, in which both sides made concessions 
and compromises but Germany ultimately pushed through many of its preferences. According to some 
observers, with the European Council meeting of December 8-9, 2011 and the introduction of the 
Fiscal Compact, Merkel “won the battle by ‘institutionalizing’ austerity” (Hübner 2012, 174), and was 
certainly not reluctant anymore. As Bulmer (2014, 1249) puts it, the management of the Eurozone 
crisis marked “a new stage in German European policy,” in which “national interests and 
assertiveness” as well as “[g]reater unilateralism” emerged. In terms of our conceptualization of 
reluctance, therefore, Germany shifted from strong to intermediate-to-moderate reluctance, as 
recalcitrance remained constant while hesitation almost disappeared. As a result of managing the 
Eurozone crisis, Germany was no longer so reluctant in its economic/financial policy. 
Germany and the Intervention in Libya: A Reluctant Approach 
If we shift to the field of security, the 2011 intervention in Libya on the basis of UNSC Resolution 
1973 and the Responsibility-to-Protect principle has been one of the salient cases of crisis 
management in the European neighborhood in recent years. Germany, which was a non-permanent 
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UNSC member at the time, abstained on Resolution 1973, which envisaged the creation of a no-fly 
zone and authorized all necessary means (except a foreign “occupation force”) to protect Libyan 
civilians. This abstention, with which Berlin deviated from the position of its Western international 
partners, instead taking a common stance with China, Russia, India and Brazil, is frequently taken as 
an example of Berlin’s “reluctance” or “unwillingness to play a leadership role” (Bulmer and Paterson 
2013, 1400) on security policy issues. According to some authors, the decision stood in the tradition of 
Germany’s Kultur der Zurückhaltung (culture of restraint) and of its “civilian power” approach to the 
use of military force (Maull 2012). Again, an application of the previously developed concept of 
reluctance can prove helpful to assess German policies. According to the conceptualization of 
reluctance developed in this paper, in fact, a coherent and consistent implementation of a policy of 
Zurückhaltung would not amount to reluctance. But in the decision on Libya the German government 
was far from coherent in its approach.  
Berlin’s policies involved both the elements of hesitation and recalcitrance. The German 
government’s recalcitrance mainly manifests itself in the skepticism (rejection of requests) articulated 
by German representatives towards French and British efforts to create a consensus on a no-fly zone. 
For example, at the G-8 meeting of foreign ministers in Paris on March 14-15, 2011, Germany 
reportedly acted as a “brakesman” (Rinke 2011, 48) vis-à-vis French requests. Germany’s abstention 
ultimately did not block Resolution 1973 – and Berlin took care that it would not be responsible for 
making the resolution fail (Brockmeier 2014, 80) – so German recalcitrance did not reach the level of 
“blocking others’ initiatives.”  
Germany’s handling of the crisis was characterized, moreover, by extreme hesitation. We can 
observe flip-flopping, that is, rapidly changing and contradictory statements and policies on the part of 
the German government. First of all, less than three weeks before the abstention on Resolution 1973, 
Germany voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1970, which condemned Gaddafi’s use of force against 
civilians and already invoked the principle of Responsibility to Protect. Berlin “even criticised its 
fellow European countries for not having condemned Gadhafi earlier and with clearer language” 
(Brockmeier 2014, 66) and German diplomats were “ ‘supportive’ and even ‘pushy’ ” during the 
process of drafting and discussing Resolution 1970 (ibid.). Apparently, German Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle “initially [offered] no opposition to a no-fly zone” (ibid., 67) and started criticizing it 
only in early March. A further indicator of Germany’s contradictory approach were the shifting 
requirements for the involvement of Arab states articulated by Westerwelle: he first argued that a no-
fly-zone mandate would need the “approval” of Arab states, later set their “active participation” in the 
implementation as a condition, and ultimately argued that their “leadership” would be necessary (ibid., 
67; 76). More generally, Germany’s decision on abstention in the UNSC was characterized by several 
mishaps. These included a parliamentary debate that was carried out without knowledge of a sudden 
shift in the United States’ approach, and some degree of confusion on the part of the Foreign Minister 
about the nexus between supporting a resolution and the need to subsequently participate in military 
operations (Brockmeier 2014). To add to the confusion, in an interview published four days after the 
German abstention, Foreign Minister Westerwelle stated “Gaddafi has to go” (Neukirch et al. 2011). 
This strongly reluctant policy, which displayed intermediate levels of recalcitrance and high levels of 
hesitation, was perceived by Germany’s allies as “disconcerting and half-hearted” (Maull 2012, 36) 
and led several commentators to accuse Germany of having impeded a common European action and 
possibly contributed to a worse outcome of the Libyan crisis (Erlanger and Dempsey 2011; Münkler 
2015, 149). For others, it was an indicator that Germany would “continue […] to punch below its 
weight in foreign and security policy” (Paterson 2011, 74). 
Germany and the Ukraine Crisis: Leaving Reluctance Behind? 
An important shift in Germany’s approach to the management of security crises in Europe’s 
neighborhood came with the Ukraine crisis, in which Germany displayed an entirely new 
determination and at least partially shed its reluctance in foreign and security policy. At the end of 
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January 2014, German President Gauck, Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and Defence Minister von der 
Leyen in their speeches at the Munich Security Conference called for a new German foreign policy – a 
“faster, more decisive and more substantial” (Bundespräsident 2014; AA 2014) way of dealing with 
international affairs in order to “enhance our international responsibility” (BMVg 2014). Events in 
Ukraine, most notably Russia’s annexation of Crimea after pro-Russian militias started taking over the 
peninsula on 26 February, forced Germany to act sooner than it had probably expected. The German 
government, and particular the new foreign minister in the “grand coalition” of CDU/CSU and SPD, 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, had already played an active role in negotiations during the repression of the 
“Euromaidan” movement, together with his French and Polish colleagues. When the crisis further 
escalated with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Chancellor Merkel “immediately declared Russia’s 
armed takeover of Crimea to be unacceptable” (Pond 2015, 173). In the following months, the German 
government rather coherently pursued an approach that 1) consistently focused on negotiations, paying 
attention not to break ties with Moscow; 2) rejected a military solution; and 3) put pressure on 
Moscow through increasingly tougher sanctions. Importantly, Germany had the opportunity to play a 
leading role in crisis management because “Obama, fully occupied with other world crises, essentially 
outsourced [Western diplomacy] to Berlin” (Pond 2015, 173). Within the EU, Germany did not 
encounter much opposition to its policies and was able to rally support for the sanctions (Münkler 
2015, 152-3; Szabo 2014, 117), while Russia itself saw Berlin as the most acceptable Western 
interlocutor (Münkler 2015, 152-3). At the domestic level, Merkel managed to induce the business 
lobby to accept sanctions, despite the heavy losses they would imply for German companies (Pond 
2015, 174). In other words, the case of Ukraine crisis management reveals that reluctance seems to 
become less likely as pressures from external and domestic actors on a government diminish and 
become streamlined. Germany was certainly recalcitrant on topics like the supply of weapons to the 
Ukrainian government, something the United States called for in early 2015. However, this 
recalcitrance was not paired with hesitation as in previous crises. On some issues contradictions 
emerged, for example on the potential provision of support for NATO member states faced with the 
threat of Russian aggression, an issue that was raised by Defence Minister von der Leyen but quickly 
abandoned (Szabo 2014, 120). In general terms, however, German policies were remarkably consistent 
and coherent. Overall, while at the time of writing (May 2015) the Ukraine crisis is far from resolved, 
at least so far it has seemed to mark a shift away from previous reluctance on the part of Berlin. 
Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to develop a conceptualization of reluctance in international politics – a notion 
that is frequently used but has not been explicitly discussed or properly defined so far. The 
conceptualization built upon 1) existing uses of the concept in the literature in order to identify the 
broad semantic field to which it relates; and 2) the concept’s relationship to related terms in the 
academic debate. Based on this concept reconstruction, reluctance was characterized as entailing the 
two constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance. Corresponding indicators for empirical 
analyses were identified and the concept structure was outlined. In order to demonstrate the usefulness 
of the concept for empirical analyses, it was applied to studying Germany’s approach to crisis 
management in different fields in Europe and the European neighborhood. This assessment of German 
policies through the lens of reluctance is useful in various ways. First, it brings some clarity to a 
debate that has often framed reluctance in terms of missed leadership opportunities, thereby working 
mostly with counterfactuals. If we conceptualize reluctance in terms of hesitation and recalcitrance, 
without tying the concept to any specific issue area of policy-making or to notions such as leadership 
or hegemony, we find that Germany was highly reluctant at the beginning of the Eurozone crisis and 
during the Libyan crisis, but it was not during the Ukraine crisis. The second advantage of the 
conceptualization of reluctance proposed in this paper is that it allows for identification of shifts in 
reluctant behavior, for example the shift towards a less reluctant approach in the Eurozone crisis 
around 2011. The distinction between hesitation and recalcitrance allows us to further disentangle 
these dynamics, as was highlighted for the case of the Eurozone crisis, in which Germany remained 
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recalcitrant over time while nevertheless becoming less and less hesitant. This growing determination 
and assertiveness was quite the opposite of reluctance and led to a high degree of opposition to 
German policies in southern Europe and to a growing skepticism vis-à-vis Berlin. Third, the relatively 
open conceptualization of reluctance allows us to apply the concept across policy fields and thereby to 
highlight possible links or even contagion effects between these fields. Based on the cases of crisis 
management analyzed for Germany, we notice, for example, that Berlin first shed its reluctance in the 
field of economic/financial policy, while still being reluctant in the field of security – an issue area in 
which it is subject to particular institutional limitations (Paterson 2011, 73) and, for historical reasons, 
to strong normative constraints. Only after having adopted increasingly assertive policies in the 
management of the Eurozone crisis did Germany also shift to a less reluctant approach on security 
matters, in the Ukraine crisis. 
Beyond the details of German policies, this application of the concept of reluctance provides 
several interesting insights that open avenues for future research. In particular, the Eurozone crisis 
seems to have led to a clear rise in (perceived) German power, so we can think of Germany not just as 
the regional power in Europe, but possibly also as a rising power in international affairs. The question 
then emerges of what the broader potential impact of rising powers’ reluctant policies is. In terms of 
regional governance, we can expect a reluctant approach to have detrimental consequences as it 
generates uncertainty and suspicion among smaller regional states. At the same time, reluctance can 
also be a prudent policy approach for rising powers to adopt, with the aim of preventing opposition or 
even the formation of balancing alliances as they grow stronger. On a larger scale, a reluctant attitude 
on the part of a rising regional power can provoke disillusionment among international partners – and 
the impression that “reluctant guardians” (Bunde and Oroz 2015) are indeed contributing to a 
disruption of international order. An assessment of the implications of reluctance for regional and 
global governance is therefore an important avenue for future research. 
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